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The aim of this article is to investigate the relevance and implications of synthetic models
for the study of the interactive dimension of minimal life and cognition, by taking into
consideration how the use of artificial systems may contribute to an understanding of
the way in which interactions may affect or even contribute to shape biological identities.
To do so, this article analyzes experimental work in synthetic biology on different types of
interactions between artificial and natural systems, more specifically: between protocells
and between biological living cells and protocells. It discusses how concepts such as
control, cognition, communication can be used to characterize these interactions from
a theoretical point of view, which criteria of relevance and evaluation of synthetic models
can be applied to these cases, and what are their limits.
Keywords: regulation, synthetic models, communication, minimal cognition, criteria of relevance, criteria of
evaluation, Turing test
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has been characterized by an increased interest in synthetic models of interactive
biological phenomena, from the study of properties of collective prebiotic systems in origins of
life scenarios1 and biological communication,2 to the exploration of the possible contributions of
Synthetic Biology to research in Artificial Intelligence.3
The aims, scope and conceptual foundations of this enterprise are still in course of definition,
and this article addresses some of themain conceptual issues raised by it. It focuses on how synthetic
biology can contribute to the study of those biological and cognitive phenomena, such as for
example communication, that arise in nature from the interaction between biological systems. In
doing so, it takes into considerations di erent types of inter-systems interactions studied through
synthetic models: structural and (minimally) cognitive. Structural interactions are defined as those
1For example, colonies of giant vesicles (Carrara et al., 2012) and predator–prey interactions in protocells (Qiao et al., 2017).
2This research line has been focusing on interactions between biological cells and protocells (Gardner et al., 2009;
Lentini et al., 2017; Rampioni et al., 2014).
3This research line has been pursued by focusing either on information technologies that realize computation through bio-
chemical systems (Amos et al., 2011), or on biochemically-grounded embodied artificial intelligence (Stano et al., 2018).
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interactions that directly a ect the constitution of the system;
cognitive ones as those interactions that aremediated by sensory–
e ector regulatory mechanisms.
This article discusses what kind of impact these interactions
have on the systems involved, and whether and how they
a ect the identities of such systems. The “identity” of the
system, in this context, is defined by the specific organization
that characterizes it, and which is kept invariant despite the
structural variations that may a ect the components (Maturana
and Varela, 1980).4 As part of the research topic “Inter-identities’
in Life, Mind, and Society,” this article analyzes how identities
in interaction can be studied by means of synthetic biology. It
is important to emphasize that synthetic models raise closely
interconnected theoretical and epistemological questions in
relation to interactive identities. The theoretical question is
twofold. On the one hand it concerns the relationship between
the identity of a system and its interactive capabilities, i.e., how
the organization of a system specifies the types of interactions
the system can participate in. On the other hand, it concerns
whether and how interactions between systems may change their
intrinsic properties. Yet analyzing models cannot be separated
from the problem of assessing their relevance for studying cases
of interacting identities in nature, and from the complex question
of how to evaluate whether the models are successful or not in
contributing to an understanding of these phenomena.
Accordingly, this article analyzes and discusses four di erent
issues regarding interactive synthetic models: theoretical
grounding, criteria of relevance, realization, and strategies of
evaluation. To address the issue of the theoretical grounding
of interactive synthetic models, in section “Theoretical
Grounding: Structural and Cognitive Interactions” it provides
a characterization of interactions at the specific level which
is relevant for synthetic biology. Of particular interest in this
context are those interactive properties that can be realized in
synthetic biological systems through biochemical mechanisms.
The paper adopts a specific theoretical account of minimal
cognition based on the notion of biological autonomy to
distinguish between structural and cognitive interactions and
to provide theoretical tools for their synthetic investigation.
It applies this framework to the analysis of those synthetic
models that explore interactions – e.g., communication –
between systems (i.e., between artificial systems, and between
artificial and living systems), rather than between one system
and its generic environment, and puts into evidence the main
challenges they face.
On the basis of the theoretical framework proposed, section
“Criteria of Relevance of Interactive Synthetic Models” provides
an epistemological analysis of the criteria of relevance of synthetic
models, and discusses how they apply to this specific scenario in
which the focus is on structural and cognitive interactions.
The third issue addressed in this article is the realization of
interactive synthetic models. The theoretical and epistemological
tools developed in sections “Theoretical Grounding: Structural
and Cognitive Interactions” and “Criteria of Relevance
4For the more general philosophical debate on the notion of identity, see
Williamson (1990); Lowe (2002), Miller (2010), and Noonan and Curtis (2018).
of Interactive Synthetic Models,” are employed in section
“The Realization of Interactive Synthetic Models” to discuss
experimental examples of two classes of interactive synthetic
models, which cover di erent types of interacting entities at
distinct levels of organization:
(1) Interactions between protocells.
(2) Communication between living cells and protocells.
Finally, section “Conclusions: Evaluation Strategies” discusses
limits and merits of three di erent strategies of evaluation
of interactive synthetic models: Turing tests, demarcating
definitions, and operational approaches. It argues that
operational evaluation strategies are the most suitable with
regards to the types of phenomena described and theoretical
questions addressed by interactive models.
THEORETICAL GROUNDING:
STRUCTURAL AND COGNITIVE
INTERACTIONS
In order to discuss the contributions of synthetic models to
the study of biological and cognitive interactive phenomena, a
theoretical framework is required. The framework adopted in
this article is the organizational one, based on the notion of
autonomy (Varela, 1979; Maturana and Varela, 1980; Kau man,
2000; Moreno and Mossio, 2015). The notion of autonomy has
been often applied in Synthetic Biology to study origins of life,
minimal life (Luisi and Varela, 1989; Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno,
2004; Luisi, 2006), andminimal cognition (Bourgine and Stewart,
2004; Stano et al., 2012; Bich andMoreno, 2016). This framework
has also been used to develop epistemological tools to analyze
synthetic models (Damiano et al., 2011).
According to this framework, a biological organization – such
as a bacterium – is autonomous because it is capable of producing
its own functional components and maintaining itself in far from
equilibrium conditions. A living system cannot exist unless it
maintains a continuous coupling with its environment, made
possible by an internal dynamical variability, which enables the
system to exert a fine-tuned control upon the exchanges of matter
and energy with the surroundings and bring forth di erent viable
responses to a variety of environmental perturbations.
In this scenario, the identity of the system is identified with
its self-maintaining autonomous organization: the dimension of
the system that is maintained invariant despite the continuous
structural variations that occur as its components are synthesized,
transformed and degraded and its dynamics are perturbed by
interactions with the environment and with other autonomous
systems. To analyze interacting identities from this perspective,
it is necessary to consider (1) what types of interactions between
biological autonomous systems are enabled by their distinctive
organizations and (2) how such interactions may a ect the
identities of the interacting systems.
Let us start by considering how interactions are characterized
within this framework. Traditional work on biological
autonomy – in particular Piaget’s (1967) and Maturana and
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Varela’s (1980) – and more recent contributions (Stewart, 1992;
Bourgine and Stewart, 2004) have defended the thesis, also
known as the “Life = Cognition Thesis” (Heschl, 1990),
according to which the interactive dimension of life is related
to, or coincides with cognition. In this perspective cognition is
defined as the interactions with the environment and the relative
internal modifications that an organism can undergo without
losing its identity (see also Bitbol and Luisi, 2004; Damiano and
Luisi, 2010; Bich and Damiano, 2012). The thesis is based on
the implicit assumption that living systems are adaptive, in the
sense that they are capable of interacting viably with a changing
environment by modifying their internal structures. Whereas
a perturbation is just external influence for physical systems,
living systems, instead, adaptively integrate, and transform it into
a “meaningful interpretation” (Heschl, 1990, p. 13). However,
the identification of minimal cognition with all the interactions
an organism can undergo without losing its identity5 can be
criticized as too broad, on the grounds that it would include:
(1) cases of mere covariance between system and environment;
(2) the metabolizing of environmental substrates; (3) purely
mechanical interactions that cause changes in the systems
involved (see also Bich and Moreno, 2016).
To provide a more precise account of the types of interactions
biological autonomous systems can experience, and whether
or not they may be considered as minimally cognitive, let us
first consider which internal changes a minimal living system
can undergo without losing its identity while interacting with
the environment. According to recent developments of the
autonomy framework, the internal changes an autonomous
biological system can undergo fall into two general categories:
dynamic stability and regulation (Bich et al., 2016). Dynamic
stability is an internal response to interactions with the
environment instantiated, for example, by the basic (first-order)
metabolic network of processes of production of the components
(e.g., enzymes catalyzing metabolic reactions) that realize the
living system. It is a general network property: variations in
a given process or subsystem can propagate throughout the
living system, producing the change of one or several other
processes which, in turn, compensate for the initial one. As a
result, the system can be regarded as stable. At the level of the
basic first-order metabolic regime of self-production and self-
maintenance of the system, the compensation for perturbations
occurs through reciprocal adjustments between the activity
of components, such as enzymes, involved in processes of
production, usually stoichiometrically, depending on changes in
concentrations of metabolites. These internal changes support
a type of interaction with the environment that relies on the
structural plasticity of the system. These structural interactions
are governed by first-order mechanisms and are the most
basic responses a system can bring forth while interacting with
its environment.
The second type of response falls under the category of
regulation, and requires, instead, a more complex, hierarchical
architecture. It consists in the capability to selectively switch
between di erent basic (first-order) regimes of self-maintenance
5A strong “L = C Thesis”.
in response to interactions with the environment or to internal
variations, due to the action of dedicated (second-order)
subsystems that are specifically sensitive to these variations.
When regulation is at work, the internal dynamics of the
basic first-order regime of self-production of the living system
are modulated by specialized second-order sensory–e ector
mechanisms. The activation of these mechanism is triggered
by external or internal variations, and as a result of their
regulatory activity, the system is able to maintain its viability.
Minimal examples of regulatory mechanisms are the lac-operon,
the tryptophan operon, or the chemotactic signal transduction
pathway, to cite just a few well known cases of modulation
of the basic (first-order) metabolic and agential dynamics of
a system. The distinctive feature of regulatory mechanisms is
that as second-order control subsystems they are operationally
decoupled from the first-order regime they regulate.6
After distinguishing these two general types of adaptive7
interactions, based on dynamic stability and regulation
respectively, it is possible to discuss whether or not they
can ground cognitive properties, as claimed by the L = C thesis.
Let us consider a distinctive feature of cognition, which can
be realized by minimal living systems. It is the capability to
identify or distinguish between some features of their interaction
with the environment (for example, the sensing of variations in
boundary conditions, concentrations of nutrients, and presence
of predators) and to act accordingly, in such a way as to
maintain viability. As argued in Bich and Moreno (2016), these
cognitive capabilities, at a minimal level, necessarily require
regulatory mechanisms in the context of a self-maintaining
biological system.
Structural interactions, sustained by distributed responses in a
regime of dynamic stability, cannot account for this distinctively
cognitive capacity to make meaningful distinctions and to act
accordingly. In this type of interactions perturbations just trigger
internal changes that are percolated through the system by
means of reciprocal adjustments between the activities of the
components of the first-order network: the environment is only a
source of generic noise.
The requirement for cognition can bemet, instead, in presence
of dedicated regulatory mechanisms, endowed with sensory–
e ector capabilities, whose response is the result of the evaluation
of perturbations. By means of second-order, operationally
decoupled regulatory mechanisms, the system establishes some
categories in the environment (sensory capability), and employs
them to modulate its own internal dynamics in a viable way
(e ector capability) in such a way that the system maintains
its identity. The organism does things according to what
it distinguishes in its interactions with the environment. It
6Regulatory mechanisms are specialized subsystems dedicated to the modulation
of the first-order regime they control. The relation between regulator and regulated
subsystems, therefore, is asymmetrical. Regulatory subsystems do not operate as
nodes of the same basic network of mechanisms of production of components, but
exhibit degrees of freedom that are not specified by the dynamics of the regulated
subsystems. Such a local independence allows regulatory subsystems to modulate
first-order ones in a relatively independent way. See Bich et al. (2016) for more
details on the features and requirements for decoupled regulatory mechanisms.
7“Adaptive” is used in this context as an interaction that triggers a viable response
by means of internal changes in the perturbed system.
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modulates its own constitutive dynamics coherently with the
variations that activated the regulatory mechanisms, and as a
result it maintains its viability in the changing environment: for
example, it changes direction of movement or synthesizes a new
set of enzymes that allows it to metabolize di erent substances.
In this way, perturbations achieve an endogenous, operational
meaningful, significance for the system, which can be considered
cognitive in a minimal sense. According to this perspective,
therefore, the adaptive behavior of minimal organisms such as
bacteria is already cognitive, but only insofar as it is supported
by regulatory mechanisms.8
From this theoretical standpoint it is possible to discriminate
between cognitive and non-cognitive (structural) adaptive
interactions. The advantage of this framework is that it
provides conceptual tools that can be operationally applied in
the biochemical domain to study di erent minimal biological
interactions – structural and cognitive – by means of synthetic
models. An example of synthetic realization of cognitive adaptive
properties is the implementation of biochemical sensory–e ector
regulatory mechanisms in protocells or semisynthetic cells (e.g.,
compartmentalized riboswitches) (Martini and Mansy, 2011).
The synthetic investigation of structural and cognitive
interactions and of their relationship with the identity of the
systems involved can be pursued in two ways. One is to focus
on one artificial system and to analyze how it interacts adaptively
with its environment by means of either distributed or self-
regulatory mechanisms (see Bich and Moreno, 2016). The other
way, which is discussed in the rest of this article, is to explore the
possibilities opened by the adaptive interactions between systems
(artificial systems or artificial systems with biological ones). It is
inspired by a long research tradition in cybernetics and systems
theory opened by the pioneering work carried out by Ashby
(1954, 1956), Beer (1972), and Pask (1975), among others –,
who had been focusing on the interactive dynamics of systems
of di erent nature (e.g., computational, biological, social, etc.)
endowed with self-regulatory mechanisms.9
CRITERIA OF RELEVANCE OF
INTERACTIVE SYNTHETIC MODELS
In biological systems, constitutive and regulatory adaptive
mechanisms – which underlie structural and cognitive
interactions, respectively – are endogenously produced and
maintained. With their activity, they functionally contribute
8Very di erent views have been defended with regards to the nature and lower
boundaries of minimal cognition. Some cognitive capabilities have been attributed
to chemical systems below the threshold of life, like oil droplets, justified on the
basis of their chemotactic behavior which mimics that of bacteria (Hanczyc and
Ikegami, 2010). Approaches focused on the specific features of the organizations –
i.e., minimal biochemical mechanisms – underlying cognitive capabilities, such
as chemotaxis and communication, identify cognition at the level of prokaryotes
(van Duijn et al., 2006; Bich and Moreno, 2016). Others identify cognition only in
organisms with nervous system (Christensen and Hooker, 2000; Barandiaran and
Moreno, 2006). See Godfrey-Smith (2016) for a discussion of di erent accounts of
minimal cognition and of the main transitions in the evolution of cognition and
subjectivity.
9See Damiano (2009) and Pickering (2010) for an analysis of this research
tradition.
to the existence of the same system that produces them.10
The synthetic modeling of these interactions can be pursued
in two di erent ways. The first consists in the realization of
full-fledged interactive systems. It requires integrating regulatory
mechanisms into a whole regime of self-production and self-
maintenance. However, this approach is especially problematic
to pursue in protocells, due to di culties in realizing a full
self-maintaining metabolism (Rampioni et al., 2014). Therefore,
at the current state of the art, it is pursued by using metabolically
active biological cells as starting points. The second approach
aims to realize life-like adaptive systems in order to investigate
by means of artificial systems specific aspects that are of special
interest for a better understanding of structural or minimally
cognitive interactions.
Before analyzing how these approaches can be pursued in
synthetic biology to investigate interactive identities and how
to evaluate the results obtained, let us take an epistemological
step and discuss the criteria to assess the criteria of relevance of
interactive synthetic models to the study these interactions. As
argued by Damiano et al. (2011) and Damiano and Cañamero
(2010, 2012), one of the goals of a theoretically inspired synthetic
approach is to create trans-disciplinary exchanges with natural
sciences that inspire naturally based technologies, and provide
new insights into natural phenomena by means of artificial
systems.11 In this context, the synthetic approach can allow to
experimentally explore aspects of life and cognition that are not
(easily) accessible by directly investigating natural systems. It can
do so by actually constructing the object of study, an alternative
biological or proto-biological system, and study the properties
and behaviors it exhibits.
What is the relevance of synthetic models for the scientific
investigation of the target interactive biological or cognitive
phenomena? Damiano et al. (2011) distinguish two main types
of relevance: phenomenological and organizational. A synthetic
model is phenomenologically relevant if it produces, according
to explicit parameters, the same phenomenology as a living
or cognitive system, regardless of the underlying mechanisms,
which can be very di erent. In the case of minimal cognition, for
example, a model is relevant at the phenomenological level if it
produces the same behavior as a cognitive system, or it engages
in similar interactive dynamics.
A paradigmatic case of phenomenological relevance of
interactive synthetic models is constituted by relatively simple
artificial (chemical) systems such as self-propelled oil droplets
capable of chemotaxis (Hanczyc and Ikegami, 2010) (Figure 1B).
Chemotaxis is a behavior also exhibited by biological systems
such as bacteria (Figure 1A), and it is often considered
a hallmark of minimal cognition (van Duijn et al., 2006;
Bich and Moreno, 2016).
Both systems, bacteria and droplets, show a similar
phenomenology: they are capable of moving and following
a chemical gradient. Yet, despite the similarity of behavior,
10This is an important di erence with hardware-based artificial systems, in which
parts are put together fromwithout, and interact to produce a certain e ect without
their operations a ecting their conditions of existence.
11See also Pfeifer and Scheier (1999); Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno (2013), and
Green (2017).
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FIGURE 1 | Systems capable of chemotactic behavior by means of radically different mechanisms: (A) The sensory motor pathway of a chemotactic bacterium and
its relative independence from metabolism (from Egbert et al., 2010, reproduced under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License); and (B) a
self-propelled droplet (reproduced with permission from Hanczyc et al., 2007). Copyright (2007) American Chemical Society.
the way behavior itself is generated is very di erent in the two
cases. Self-propelled droplets do not self-maintain like living
cells do. The movement of droplets does not rely on nutrients
encountered while exploring the environment, but they move
by consuming the internal propeller (oleic anhydride) that is
already available. In turn, the movement does not contribute to
the existence and maintenance of the droplet as it does, instead,
in bacteria. There is no internal organizational di erentiation
(no modular subsystems) within the droplets. Bacteria, instead,
exhibit a complex regulatory mechanism (the signal transduction
pathway) that modulates a motor system, plus a decoupled
metabolism which provides movement and energy to the system.
Finally, the direction of the movement of the droplet is directly
controlled by the gradient rather than, like in bacteria, by the
specific organization of a sensory–e ector regulatory subsystem.
While giving precious information on the interactive
dynamics of the entities involved, synthetic models that exhibit
phenomenological relevance alone – insofar as they provide a
point of view that is external to the system and focused on a
behavioral description – fail to account for the distinctive features
of minimally interactive systems and to discriminate between
di erent types of interactions. For example, if the defining
features of minimal cognition are identified in self-regulatory
biochemical mechanisms subject to a regime of self-maintenance,
then they need to be investigated at a di erent level of analysis,
internal to the system. The same holds for structural interactions,
which rely on distributed compensatory mechanisms. Modeling
these interactions, therefore, requires di erent types of synthetic
models, whose relevance lies in the organizational, instead of
phenomenological, dimension.
A synthetic model is organizationally relevant if it realizes
the same organization as the living or cognitive system which
is the object of investigation (Damiano et al., 2011); in other
words, if it realizes the same or a very similar identity.
This criterion of relevance focuses the attention on the way
components and processes are wired together, according to a
specific theory of life and/or cognition. The primary target is
not the features of a phenomenon or behavior, but how it is
generated. However, achieving organizational relevance does not
imply that there should be a strict correspondence between
the specific components of the model and the target system.
The same type of organization (understood as the topology
of relations between components) can be realized by di erent
structures (Maturana and Varela, 1980). Synthetic biologists,
therefore, can use whichever minimal biochemical tools they
have available to achieve their modeling goal and produce
organizationally relevant systems, without the need to reproduce
the exact composition of current biological systems, which is the
result of a long, complex, and not yet well understood historical
process of prebiotic and biological evolution.
The ultimate target for organizationally relevant synthetic
models in the framework of biological autonomy is to realize self-
producing and self-maintaining protocells capable of interacting
adaptively with their environment. Another way to develop
organizationally relevant models consists in narrowing down
the scope of the model and investigating a specific property
or capability of a living of cognitive system, instead of the
whole, integrated, entity. In such cases a model achieves what
can be called a mechanism-related organizational relevance by
realizing the same underlying mechanism responsible for a
specific behavior or phenomenon.
An example of this approach in relation to the study
minimal cognition is the case of sensory–e ector mechanisms
implemented in protocells, which allow protocells to sense the
environment and change their internal activity accordingly.
Such mechanisms have been realized by endowing protocells
with riboswitches. As shown experimentally by Martini and
Mansy (2011), protocells enclosing riboswitches can indeed sense
specific molecules and respond to them by activating DNA-
transcription mechanisms (Figure 2). This approach allows
investigating specific mechanisms by means of synthetic models,
without incurring into the overwhelming di culties of realizing
fully fledged artificial autonomous systems. While at the moment
this model does not provide direct insight upon the contribution
of such adaptive mechanisms to the internal dynamics and
maintenance of the system, it can be particularly interesting from
a point of view focused on interactions, as a starting point to study
the roots of minimal interactive capabilities of biological systems
by modeling their underlying adaptive mechanisms.
Organizational relevance refers to the capability of models to
account for the identity of the natural systems under scrutiny. To
study interactive identities synthetic models should include those
types of internal mechanisms responsible for adaptive structural
or cognitive adaptive interactions. Yet the target of these models
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FIGURE 2 | Compartmentalized, cell-like systems that sense and respond to their environments through riboswitch activity. (A) The presence of an extravesicular
ligand converts the cell-like system from the OFF-state to the ON-state. (B) RNA (squiggly line) is transcribed from DNA (double line). RNA is only translated into
protein (star) in the presence of the activator ligand, which in this case is theophylline (Martini and Mansy, 2011, p. 10734; reproduced by permission of The Royal
Society of Chemistry).
is not adaptivity alone, but also how biological or life-like systems
are capable of adaptively interacting among themselves. Therefore,
in order to study interactive identities, also an external (inter-
system) point of view is needed, capable of specifically taking
into account the features of the interactions that those systems
undergo without losing their viability, and how the consequent
internal modifications in turn a ect their identities.
It follows that relevant interactive synthetic models should
satisfy criteria belonging to both the general classes introduced
by Damiano and collaborators (Damiano et al., 2011). They
need to satisfy organizational criteria of relevance for regulatory
mechanisms or structural plasticity: either full-fledged, within
self-maintaining systems, or mechanism-related, within non-
autonomous protocells. But they need to satisfy the criterion
of phenomenological interactive relevance as well, to be useful
tools to explore some aspects of the natural phenomenology of
interacting natural systems. To achieve this type of relevance,
they need to exhibit sustained successful interactions: that is,
viable and leading to adaptive modifications (new responses).
THE REALIZATION OF INTERACTIVE
SYNTHETIC MODELS
To summarize the previous steps, structural interactions in
biological systems rely on distributed responses enabled by
the plasticity of the basic network of first-order metabolic
components, while minimally cognitive ones rely on dedicated
self-regulatory mechanisms. This section will focus on two types
of interactive synthetic models: interactions between protocells,
and communication between protocells and natural cells. The
aim of these groups of examples is to shed light on di erent
aspects of interactive synthetic models – respectively, structural
and cognitive – in order to discuss: (1) their theoretical pertinence
in modeling interactive identities; (2) how the identities of the
systems involved are a ected; and (3) whether or not they
satisfy the di erent criteria of relevance relative to the type of
interactive phenomenon investigated and the specific theoretical
aims of the models.
Constitutive Interaction Between
Protocells
The most basic explorations of interactive phenomena by means
of synthetic models are represented by the study of interactions
between entirely synthetic systems. The focus is on life-like
collective phenomena at the level of protocells, designed with
the aim to establish how deeply these phenomena are rooted in
prebiotic evolution and what role they might have played in the
origins of life.
Let us consider two cases: protocell colonies and protocell
predation. Experiments with compartmentalized systems, such
as liposomes, exhibit problems related to the low permeability
of these vesicles, making the incorporation of materials within
individual vesicles, or the exchange of material between them
very di cult. That is an important issue for the study of
the origins of life, insofar as it represents a serious obstacle
to the incorporation and exchange of substrates necessary for
the beginning of a proto metabolism. In addition to these
experimental issues related to the construction and study of
individual vesicles, the fact that unicellular prokaryotic organisms
live in colonies has given support to the hypothesis that life might
have arisen collectively from the cooperation between prebiotic
systems, and that important steps in prebiotic evolutions has
been enabled by collective phenomena. To pursue this lead,
Carrara et al. (2012) have investigated the properties of colonies
of giant oleate-based vesicles with negatively charged membranes
(Figure 3). The results show that these vesicles form physically
stable colonies, attach to solid substrates and exhibit the
capability to attract positively charged compounds. Importantly,
if compared to individual vesicles, those vesicles belonging to
colonies exhibit increased permeability and the capability to
incorporate solutes and even larger compounds, which can attach
to the membrane and slowly penetrate it without causing its
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FIGURE 3 | Interactions between protocells. Reciprocal attraction and progressive accretion (a–d) in colonies of giant vesicles (Carrara et al., 2012; reproduced by
permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.).
rupture. These phenomena support a possible scenario of the
origin of metabolism where externally formed polymers are
captured by primitive compartments. In addition, also colony
accretion, vesicle fusion, and exchange of material between
vesicles have been observed.
The type of interaction modeled by the synthetic systems is
structural, insofar as no regulatory mechanisms are employed but
instead the physical properties of the subsystems are involved.
It is important to point out that the interactive artificial vesicles
give rise to new capabilities owing to the collective nature of
the phenomenon.
The synthetic interactive model exhibits phenomenological
relevance insofar as it shows new biologically relevant
properties – such as collective behaviors and attachment to
substrates, exchange of materials between vesicles, etc. – and
gives rise to a successful interaction (stable and sustained).
Organizationally speaking, the system does not exhibit either
internal di erentiation or specialized mechanisms controlling
the interaction. Yet the capability of vesicles belonging to
colonies to attract and incorporate molecules can be interpreted
as organizationally relevant from a constitutive point of view
within an origin of life scenario, as a possible step toward the
emergence of metabolism.
To identify the implications of this type of model for
our understanding of interactive identities it is necessary to
consider what types of interactions are enabled by the distinctive
organizations of the systems involved and how such interactions
may a ect the identities of the interacting systems. The type
of structural interaction taking place between these oleate-
based vesicles is made possible by the electric charge of their
membranes, which allow attraction of other vesicles and chemical
compounds. The physical properties of the systems involved are
a ected and modified by such interactions, and new capabilities
are acquired at the collective level, although not directly a ecting
the very (simple) organization of the vesicles. Yet the resulting
incorporation of new material due to the increased permeability
has the potentiality for triggering organizational changes. New
molecules capable of entering new interactions and playing a
functional role in the vesicle could trigger transitions toward
new and more complex identities, for example, by catalyzing
metabolic reactions within the vesicles, or inserting themselves
into the membrane and give rise to primitive pores or channels.
The second example of syntheticmodel of a collective behavior
focuses on protocell predation, with the aim to explore its
possible role in prebiotic evolution (Qiao et al., 2017). The
investigation of this type of interaction is also based on the
assumption regarding the importance of collective phenomena
at the origins of life: that life does not occur in isolation, and
that living systems compete for resources or directly predate on
one another (Mansy, 2017). Two types of protocells are included,
which harbor di erent cargo molecules such as protease, DNA
and sugars. They are characterized by di erent compositions
of their compartments, and carry opposite electrostatic charges
to facilitate interactions. The predator protocells are constituted
by coacervates, which contain a protein -degrading enzyme
protease. The preys are proteinosomes, i.e., protocells enclosed
by a proteic compartment, and harboring DNA and sugars.
Once the two types of cells interact, the coacervates digest the
proteic membrane of the preys and assimilate their internal DNA
and sugar. Then, the presence of di erent internal molecules
in the predator can be potentially selected by the environment.
However, further e ects of predation beyond the digestion
of the prey and capture of its contents, which are structural
interactions, go beyond the scope of this synthetic model. It
does not include specialized internal adaptivemechanisms – such
as sensory-motor regulatory mechanisms usually associated to
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preying and escaping – and does not give rise to phenomena
such as population growth and inheritance. The interaction is
not sustained, but results in the metabolic absorption of the
contents of the prey protocells. In sum, this model cannot
account for coordinated behaviors between predators and preys,
and for oscillatory populations such as those exhibited by
traditional Lotka–Volterra predator–prey models. Therefore,
while describing a model of a possible structural interaction
which may radically modify the identity of the systems involved,
it exhibits low phenomenological and organizational relevance as
a model of the specific phenomenon of predation.
The organization of the systems involved enables interactions
based on reciprocal attraction of protocells due to opposite
electrostatic charges. In addition to that, the predator protocells
contain protease enzymes that allow the digestion of the proteic
membranes of the preys. The e ects of the interaction on the
identities of the two types of systems involved are di erent. The
preys disappear, while the predators acquire new components
(DNA and sugars). Yet the interaction has no e ect on the
identity of the predator unless the new components acquire a
functional role within it, thus modifying its organization.
These models provide important and original insights into the
interactive origin of some constitutive features of protocells in the
prebiotic world, such as the presence of internalmolecules despite
the absence of full-fledged membrane channels. Moreover,
both models employ electrostatically charged membranes to
facilitate structural interactions in protocells that lack sensors.
The focus here is specifically on composition and structural
properties of protocells. For these very reasons the models do
not provide information on more complex adaptive (structural
and cognitive) properties, as the protocells employed in these
synthetic models do not exhibit internal di erentiation and
regulatory mechanisms. As models of interactive capabilities,
they exhibit phenomenological relevance, insofar as they carry
out interactions that a ect the constitutive identity of the system.
Instead, they exhibit low organizational relevance, as in addition
to not realizing self-maintenance, they do not employ life-
like interactive biochemical mechanisms, but rely on opposite
membrane charges. Nevertheless, these interactions may a ect
the structures of the systems involved and have the potential to
modify their identities by triggering organizational transitions.
A possible further step into the investigation of protocell
interactions would be to increase the complexity of the systems
involved, in such a way as to model minimally cognitive
interactions. One possibility is to add basic sensory–e ector
mechanisms such as riboswitches – whose e ects change the
protocells membrane properties or behaviors toward other
protocells as a result of sensing the state of latter – and observe
the resulting collective dynamics and the potential emergence of
self-organized patterns of interactions.
Communication Between Living Cells
and Protocells
More complex types of interactions engage biological cells
and protocells. They rely on signal exchanges, enabled by
sensory–e ector mechanisms with activation of regulatory
responses. A thriving line of investigation in this branch of
synthetic biology focuses on the phenomenon of biological
communication for technological12 and theoretical purposes.13
The basic idea underlying theoretical research on synthetic
communication is to design protocells that send signals and
trigger responses in living cells such as bacteria. An example of
this approach is provided by Rampioni et al.’s (2014) simplified
model of synthetic cell sending signals to a natural cell. This study
evaluates the realizability of protocells with e ector capabilities.
The idea is to include into liposomes the biomolecular machinery
necessary to produce signal molecules (e.g., N-acyl-homoserine
lactones) that, sensed by the receptor of a natural cell, can trigger
processes of protein synthesis in the cell (Figure 4).
Amore recentmodel designed by Lentini et al. (2017) attempts
to realize a two-way communication. Endowing protocells with
the capability to sense (activating transcriptional regulatory
binding sites within the protocell) and produce quorum
molecules, it makes them able to interact with bacteria and even
to interfere with quorum sensing mechanisms in the latter.
The complexity of these models raises several theoretical and
epistemological issues when considering their phenomenological
and organizational relevance, and more generally on the
enterprise of investigating biological communication by
means of synthetic biology. The models exhibit successful
interactive capabilities through the activity of biochemical
regulatory mechanisms. In particular, the second model achieves
(mechanism-related) organizational relevance by realizing a
whole sensory–e ector mechanism, while the first model focuses
on e ector mechanisms.
Lentini et al.’s (2017) is a model of minimally cognitive-
like interactions, supported by regulatory mechanisms. Yet it is
not necessarily a model of biological communication. To make
this point clear, let us consider a well-known biological case of
interactions that are supported by sensory–e ector mechanisms,
like in the case described in Lentini et al. (2017), but are not
considered as a case of communication: the interaction between
a lion and a gazelle. It exhibits some analogies to the model
just described. The lion sees the gazelle and start chasing it. The
gazelle, seeing or hearing the lion approaching, starts running
to escape. Then the lion adjusts its course to the new path and
speed of the gazelle, etc. This is a case of cognitive interaction
in which two biological systems realize a form of coordinated
behavior supported by their own internal regulatorymechanisms.
Nevertheless, it is clearly not a case of communication.
These synthetic models face a demarcation problem. They aim
to realize communication by means of coordinated behaviors,
but the way the phenomenon of communication is framed,
would include also non-communicative cognitive interactions
such as the one exemplified by the lion chasing a gazelle.
Hence, they need a di erent theoretical grounding, based
on a conceptual framework of communication that can be
12The aim is to develop systems for the targeted administration of molecules to
living cells by means of protocells (LeDuc et al., 2007) or biochemical information
technologies (Nakano et al., 2011), among others.
13The aim in this case is to provide insight into the nature and origin of
minimal forms of biological communication by means of artificial systems
(Rampioni et al., 2014, 2019).
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FIGURE 4 | Simplified model of an artificial cell synthesizing signal molecules that can be sensed by natural cells: a liposome contains DNA and a
transcription-translation machinery (PURE system). An enzyme E is synthesized and catalyzes the reaction that produces a signal molecule S from the substrates A
and B (redrawn with modifications by Pasquale Stano from Rampioni et al., 2014).
operationalized and applied to synthetic biology and can in
principle discriminate between communication and other types
of cognitive interactions.
The account of biological communication as functional
influence seems a good candidate in this regard. In its most
general formulation, it characterizes communication as an
interaction in which a signal emitted by a sender triggers a
change in the behavior of the receiver that is functional for the
sender itself. The functional dimension is essential, as it allows
distinguishing cases of communication from other interactions
that trigger mutual changes in the systems involved. In the case of
the lion-gazelle predator–prey system, for example, it is possible
to argue that the interactions trigger changes in the behaviors of
the two systems, but not that the noise made by the lion has the
function of triggering the escape of the gazelle (Bich and Frick,
2018; Frick, 2019).
A remark is due. This specific account of communication
was introduced by Dawkins and Krebs (1978) in an evolutionary
framework, according to which what is functional for the sender,
is interpreted in terms of adaptations: the signal is a functional
trait because it allowed the ancestors of the sender to survive.
Yet, in this specific form, it cannot be applied to artificial systems
that are the result of synthetic biology rather than evolution
by natural selection. Focusing on evolutionary adaptations, it
does not support questions about communicative phenomena
happening here and now.
To be applied in synthetic biology, this account and its
functional dimension can be reformulated in organizational
terms,14 in which to say that a signal is functional, specifically
means that it contributes to the maintenance of the current
organization of the sender (Frick et al., 2019). In this form it
can be applied in principle to artificial systems and can provide
the criteria needed to overcome the demarcation problem, by
discriminating between communication and other minimally
cognitive interactive phenomena in synthetic models.
The organizational-influence approach provides an operational
characterization of communication in terms of sensory–e ector
regulatory interactions, which can be applied to the design of
those mechanisms and phenomena specifically studied through
synthetic models (Bich and Frick, 2018). Let us consider
two systems: a sender A and a receiver B. The sensory
parts of the regulatory mechanisms of A are activated by
14The organizational account defines the function of a trait in terms of
contribution to the maintenance of the system that currently harbors and produces
that trait (Mossio et al., 2009), rather than in terms of the evolutionary history of
the trait.
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specific features of their interaction with the environment,
and their e ector parts modulate the internal dynamics of
the system. The modified system A produces a signal, which
triggers a regulatory action in B, the receiver, which changes
its behavior. The new behavior of B is functional for the
sender in the sense that it contributes to the maintenance of
A in the context that activated the regulatory action in A.
According to this approach, the interaction between A and B
can be said to be both cognitive (it employs sensory–e ector
regulatory mechanisms) and communicative (it is functional
for the sender). In this case the identities of the systems
are not structurally modified like in the examples discussed
in section “Constitutive Interaction Between Protocells.” They
are supported and maintained by recruiting the functional
contributions from the receivers.
While providing demarcation criteria, this theoretical account
does not impose strong operational requirements for the
synthetic realization of communication apart from (1) the
presence of sensors and e ectors (organizational criteria
of relevance) and (2) that the operations of the systems
involved should exhibit a specific pattern of interactions (which
correspond in this case to the phenomenological interactive
criteria of relevance) (Figure 5B).
Adopting the organizational-influence account allows
reframing the models of communication between protocells
and living cells discussed above, in such a way that they can
capture the distinctiveness of communicative interactions. This
theoretical framework can be operationalized by employing
and redesigning, in terms of functional influence, the already
available protocells with sensory–e ector capabilities. A pertinent
remark that can be raised at this point is that protocells are not
functional in themselves in the sense that they are not self-
maintaining systems. This has two implications. The first is
that it is still possible to realize synthetic models that are
phenomenologically relevant but that realize only mechanism-
related organizational relevance. The second is that “life-like
FIGURE 5 | (A) A broad notion of communication modeled through the interaction of a protocell sending a signal to a living cell. This approach would include
phenomena which are not generally accepted as instances of communication. (B) A more discriminating, organizational account of communication modeled through
a functional loop realized by a living cell interacting with a protocell.
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communication” can be explored and evaluated from the point
of view of living cells – which exhibit functionality – by making
them interact with protocells endowed with sensory–e ector
regulatory mechanisms. The idea would be to re-design the
interaction by realizing systems in which sender cells are
capable, through signals, to influence protocells in a way that is
functional to the cells.
In sum, adopting a theoretical framework of communication,
such as the organizational one, capable of satisfying both
demarcation and operationability requirements can provide
guidelines for the design of synthetic models aimed at studying
the nature and minimal instances of communication as a specific
type of cognitive interaction. In particular, it puts into evidence
the necessity for modelers to shift their attention from designing
protocells that can interact with cells by triggering changes
in the latter (Figure 5A), to protocells that can participate
in functional loops with cells (Figure 5B). Moreover, the use
of these models, besides contributing to an understanding of
the most basic features of the phenomenon of communication
and its minimal instances in bacteria, can help to identify
the distinctive features of (and clarify the di erences between)
di erent types of interactions by focusing the attention on the
functional relationships between the interactors, like in the case
of communication vs predator-prey interactions.
Analyzing these models can also provide important insights
into the question of interacting identities. Organizations that
include sensory–e ector mechanisms, such as the protocells and
cells involved in communication, support minimally cognitive
interaction, beside structural ones. In the case of communication,
the interaction directly contributes to maintain the identity of
the sender and to extend its functional boundary outside the
system, as the sender recruits external functions by integrating
the receiver into a larger functional loop. If compared to
the cases of structural interactions between protocells analyzed
in section “Constitutive Interaction Between Protocells,” these
interactions have potentially a weaker e ect on the identities of
the systems involved. The di erence with the case of protocell
predation is evident. In the case of communication interactions
are managed by second-order specialized mechanisms, which
in turn modulate the internal first-order dynamics, without
the latter being directly a ected by the features of the
interaction itself.
This comparison shows how regulatory mechanisms
contribute to enhance the robustness of the system, insofar as
they prevent interactions from directly a ecting the core of the
self-maintaining regime of a system. In addition, it shows on the
one hand how regulatory mechanisms make it more di cult to
trigger radical organizational transitions in the first-order regime.
Yet, on the other hand, it shows how regulatory mechanisms
may provide more reliable ways to modify the organization of a
system toward increased complexity. A modification of the core
constitutive network of the system has a higher risk to drive the
system to disruption than to generate novel and more complex
functionalities. A modification of the regulatory subsystems that
control internal changes (e.g., switches) provides instead more
reliable solutions to introduce novel functionalities by acting on
relatively independent (decoupled) regulatory switches instead
of radically changing the more basic self-maintaining regime of
the system (Kirschner et al., 2005).
CONCLUSION: EVALUATION
STRATEGIES
Addressing the problem of the theoretical grounding of synthetic
models (see section “Theoretical Grounding: Structural and
Cognitive Interactions”), identifying the criteria of relevance
of models (see section “Criteria of Relevance of Interactive
Synthetic Models”), assessing whether or not they are satisfied
when realizing interacting synthetic models and what are
the theoretical implications of the models (see section “The
Realization of Interactive Synthetic Models”), are important
aspects of their design and discussion. They concern the
type of contribution a model can provide to the study of
a given phenomenon – in this case, structural and cognitive
interactions and their implications for the identities of the
systems involved – in relation to a given theoretical framework,
such as the organizational account based on the notion of
biological autonomy.
A further epistemological issue regarding this branch of
synthetic biology is whether and how models are successful
at what they aim to do: i.e., the problem of evaluation. This
is a particularly di cult task, insofar as these models do not
exactly aim to describe or represent natural phenomena such as
biological interactions, or to develop predictive tools. Synthetic
biology combines technological and scientific methodologies,
and this mixed nature is reflected in the goals of the models
developed (Green, 2017). On the one hand they aim to
realize systems that work, without looking for optimal solutions
(O’Malley, 2009). On the other hand, they aim to provide insights
into, or a better understanding of, certain features of natural
systems, and they do so by means of alternative realizations
(Damiano and Cañamero, 2012).
How can we assess whether or not an interactive synthetic
model is a good model of interactive identities? The dual nature
of the goals of synthetic models makes it di cult to evaluate
their success, insofar as this task needs to combine two di erent
types of criteria: (1) pragmatic “whatever works” criteria, i.e.,
the realization of a device that does what it has been designed
to do; with (2) theoretical criteria related to the contribution to
a better understanding of biological and cognitive phenomena.
The latter ones are particularly complex as they need to establish
whether an alternative realization provides useful insights into
a phenomenon under study (for example, a specific type of
interaction between living systems). In order to combine these
two types of criteria, evaluations need to take into account all
the dimensions analyzed in the previous sections, i.e., theoretical
grounding, relevance, and realization.
An ingenious strategy to evaluate synthetic models, by
specifically focusing on their interactive dimensions, has been
employed in synthetic biology with the introduction of Turing
tests for life (or for life-likeness). It explicitly aims to provide
satisfactory and unbiased criteria for evaluating the results of
the synthesis of life-like systems and behaviors. The basic idea
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is to have the model pass an evaluation according to criteria
that are not dependent on external designers or users, but are
somehow intrinsic to the domain of the phenomenon modeled
(i.e., biological or cognitive). This result can be achieved by
having the model system interact with a natural one, which will
play the role of the evaluator.
In general, the principle underlying Turing tests is that a
model is valid if it cannot be distinguished from the real thing by
an appropriate interrogator. In synthetic biology, the main idea
is to let living cells be the interrogators, and let them “evaluate”
the models by interacting with the artificial cells (Cronin et al.,
2006). This interaction can occur, for example, by means of
exchanges of signals, which at first sight makes this strategy very
suitable to evaluate interactive capabilities such as those analyzed
in the case of biological communication. For example, when
artificial cells emit signal molecules, if a response is activated in
the living cell, the artificial one passes the test for life (-likeness)
(Gardner et al., 2009).
However, this type of evaluation strategy exhibits several
limitations which make it di cult to assess the epistemic
contribution of a synthetic model to the understanding of
a biological or cognitive interactive phenomenon. Despite
aiming to provide unbiased criteria, intrinsic to the domain of
investigation, these Turing tests are still designer-dependent. The
first problem is that the scope of the test is ultimately restricted
to the “whatever works” criteria. Let us consider the case of an
artificially system (a protocell) that should trigger in a living cell
(through a signal molecule) the same response that a biological
system would. The designer establishes a priori that the life-
likeness criterion in this case consists in triggering this specific
response, and focuses on the molecule that does so. The Turing
test for life does not introduce a further designer-independent,
intrinsically biological, criterion when employing a biological
interrogator. It confirms that the artificial system does what it
was designed to do: trigger a given (already known) response.
The living cell, for example, would evaluate positively (as life-
like) any other source of the same signal, such as the direct
administration of the signal molecule by the experimenter, or by
an abiotic reaction.
The second limitation is that the test evaluates only
phenomenological mimicry. The interrogation is purely
behavioral and does not take into consideration the internal
mechanisms. This, for example, is not a good way to test for
di erent types of interactive capabilities, whether they are
cognitive, i.e., if these are theoretically characterized in terms of
regulatory mechanisms or structural, i.e., supported by internal
plasticity (distributed compensatory responses). To be more
precise, this interrogation only tests the response to mimicry
by the living cell. It does not test the behavior of the artificial
cell itself, insofar as the response depends on the nature of the
signal molecule, and not of the source of the signal. This limit is
particularly relevant when one of the aims of the synthetic model
is to investigate how di erent types of interaction take place, and
how they a ect the identities of the systems involved at the level
of their internal organization.
Let us discuss how the test applies to the models discussed
in section “The Realization of Interactive Synthetic Models,” to
assess its practical limits. Considering that the test implies the
evaluation of an artificial cells by a natural one, it does not
apply to models of interaction between protocells alone (see
section “Constitutive Interaction Between Protocells”). It can
be applied, instead, to evaluate interactions between artificial
and natural cells (see section “Communication Between Living
Cells and Protocells”), but with two caveats. In the first place,
given its focus on mimicry, it does not allow evaluating
organizational relevance. In the second place, if the focus is
on communication (between living cells and protocells) defined
in terms of functional influence of a sender upon a receiver,
what is required to be evaluated as communication is not
the presence of a response by cells to signals released from
protocells (what the Turing test for life is designed to do).
Rather, as discussed in section “Communication Between Living
Cells and Protocells” it is how living cells, the senders, change
the behavior of (non-self-maintaining) protocells, the receivers,
in such a way that the new behavior functional contribute
to the maintenance of the senders. Therefore, the test has
problems in evaluating the contribution of the model to the
understanding of a biological interactive phenomenon such
as communication.
Although limited, the Turing test for life was introduced to
overcome the problems exhibited by another evaluation tool
employed by synthetic biologists, that is, definitions (of life and
cognition) (Forlin et al., 2012). The criticisms of definitions as
a tool for synthetic biology, among other disciplines, has been
motivated by the lack of consensus on a single definition of a
given phenomenon such as life or cognition, and the consequent
failure in providing precise and universal criteria, often with
di erent definitions used by di erent research groups in the
same field. Such criticisms (Cleland, 2012; Machery, 2012) are
based on the implicit assumption that the role of definitions
is to demarcate a phenomenon such as life, and to provide
an univocal and definitive answer.15 In fact that is not their
common use, inasmuch as in the practice of synthetic biology,
conceptual models and definitions are rarely employed as direct
criteria of evaluation, but play a di erent role as theoretical and
heuristic tools that provide guidelines to build models and design
experiments.16
The limitations of straightforward evaluation tools such as
Turing tests and definitions (in the few cases when the latter are
used as demarcation tools) leave us with two possible options.
The first is to adopt minimal evaluation criteria, restricted to
only one type of goal of synthetic models, that is, successful
realization: the “whatever works” criterion. The second is to
adopt a more complex, though less straightforward, evaluation
methodology. A possible evaluation strategy of this latter type
15The same can be said about definitions of cognition.
16Definitions are not necessarily (definitive) answers, but rather ways to formulate
precise questions. In the practice of several disciplines such as synthetic biology,
artificial life, systems biology, and astrobiology, definition are used as theoretical
and epistemic tools that make assumptions explicit, clear, and challengeable, help
formulating questions, and suggest what phenomena to look for, or what to realize
in the laboratory (Bich and Green, 2018). Definitions of life are not normally used
as definitive answers and tools to demarcate life. Even in astrobiology they have
been used to design experiments and devices, not as answers about the presence
of life.
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would need to consider (at least) the three aspects which have
been analyzed in the previous sections. The first is the theoretical
pertinence: how models relate to a specific question in the given
context of the phenomenon under investigation, in this case the
nature of structural and cognitive interactions and their e ects on
the identities of the systems involved. The second concerns the
criteria of relevance that the model needs to satisfy in the light of
the question asked. Finally, the third is how the model solves the
issue practically.
Let us consider synthetic models of structural and cognitive
interactions. Their design requires a hybrid strategy which
combines phenomenological-interactive and (mechanism-
related) organizational approaches, theoretically grounded
in a definition of structural interactions as relying on first-
order network properties, involving distributed responses, and
cognitive interactions as adaptive capabilities of living systems
based on regulatory mechanisms. Their evaluation should take
into consideration: (1) how the model relates to a specific
question (its theoretical pertinence). In this case it relates to
the characterization of structural or cognitive interactions in
terms of constitutive and regulatory mechanisms, respectively;
or, in the case discussed in section “Communication Between
Living Cells and Protocells,” how the model relates to a
given theoretical account of communication. The theoretical
pertinence should include also whether the model can provide
insight into the e ects of these di erent types of interactions
on the identities of the systems involved; (2) the capability
of integrating two criteria of relevance to respond to the
theoretical question, i.e., phenomenologically interactive and
(mechanism-related) organizational ones; (3) successful design,
i.e., the fact that the synthetic model is capable of producing a
sustained interaction between the artificial and natural systems
involved.17
17 It might also include whether the model produces new unexpected phenomena:
what Damiano et al. (2011) call “progressive phenomenological relevance.”
From this perspective, the Turing test can be seen as a special
case of evaluation of successful design, detached from theoretical
considerations, restricted to cells-protocells interaction and to a
specific type of phenomenological relevance, that is, response to
mimicry, with all the limitations discussed before.
This more complex approach, instead, acknowledges the
operational role of theoretical considerations and of definitions
as guidelines for the design of experiments and models (Bich and
Green, 2018). In this case concepts and definitions are not used
as sources of checklists or tests for life or cognition (demarcation
criteria), but in combination with other types of criteria, such
as relevance and successful design. What these models tell us,
and needs to be taken into consideration in their evaluation,
is not only that interactions between protocells or between
protocells and living cells are possible, but something more on
the phenomena modeled. They can show the limits of some
implicit assumptions such as the idea of behavioral coordination
in relation to biological communication, and provide critical
insights on the e ects of di erent types of interactions upon
minimal systems, such as for example the possibility of deep
organizational transitions implied by structural interactions and
the specific contribution of regulatory mechanisms to robustness.
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